INTRODUCTION
The State of Texas has had a long history of resistance to federal environmental regulation.
1 For most of the past forty years, Texas's political leadership has been far more concerned about the negative impact that environmental regulation could have on economic growth than with the effects that pollutants could have on human beings and the global environment.
2 The state's environmental protection agency, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality ("TCEQ"), has historically taken the position that its highly qualified staff is capable of achieving the Clean Air Act's environmental goals with little oversight from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). 3 The state's powerful congressional delegation has often persuaded EPA to look the other way when TCEQ failed to meet the state's obligations under federal law. 4 Despite frequent complaints from environmental groups that TCEQ was a "toothless lapdog" for the industries that it was supposed to be regulating, 5 EPA has historically handled Texas with kid gloves. 6 That changed rather dramatically during the Obama Administration when a committed EPA Regional Administrator assumed permitting responsibilities 80 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 39 for the greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions of major stationary sources in Texas after TCEQ's Chairman and the Attorney General of Texas informed EPA that Texas would have no part of a program that they believed to be wholly unlawful and illegitimate. At the same time that Texas refused to implement EPA's GHG regulations, it vigorously challenged them in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Texas ultimately lost all of those appeals, the most recent of which was the Supreme Court's decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (" UARG"). 7 But by no means is Texas resigned to following EPA's lead in regulating GHG emissions to avoid climate disruption.
This Essay will recount the history of EPA's efforts to deal with a recalcitrant state bureaucracy and EPA-bashing political leaders as EPA attempted to reduce GHG emissions in a state that emitted more GHGs than any other state. 8 It will then offer some observations on the impact of UARG on the future of GHG regulation in Texas, a state that views UARG as a victory and remains adamantly opposed to regulating GHGs unless required to do so by federal law.
I. IMPLEMENTING EPA'S GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATIONS
When several states challenged EPA's denial of their petition to regulate GHG emissions from automobiles in Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 Texas was not among them. It intervened as a defendant to argue that EPA had no business regulating GHGs. 10 Although TCEQ is the second-largest environmental protection agency in the world with 3,000 employees and a $466 million budget, 11 it has earned a reputation as an industry-friendly regulator that would bend over backwards to avoid imposing costly controls on Texas businesses. 12 In late 2009, Governor Rick Perry appointed Bryan W. Shaw, a professor of engineering at Texas A&M University who was deeply skeptical of claims that GHG emissions caused climate disruption, to be TCEQ's Chairman. 13 The Texas Legislature, meanwhile, was dominated by free market advocates who were committed to doing the minimum necessary to allow TCEQ to satisfy the federal Clean Air Act's requirements.
14 According to a former TCEQ Commissioner, 20 An outspoken critic of TCEQ, Armendariz had worked as a consultant to state and local environmental groups in air pollution disputes.
21
One of his most important responsibilities was to oversee the implementation of EPA's GHG regulations in Texas during the time that Texas was challenging the rules in the UARG litigation.
22

B. States Begin to Implement the Rules
Following EPA's Timing and Tailoring Rules, nearly eighty percent of the states were committed to putting GHG permitting programs into effect by the January 2, 2011 deadline. 23 Even states that challenged the rules in court were trying to put programs into effect so that they could administer the federal program if it survived judicial review. A total of thirteen states lacked authority to administer GHG permitting programs, but seven of those were confident that they could obtain that authority by the deadline. 24 Six others agreed to accept a 
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Federal Implementation Plan ("FIP") that EPA was in the process of preparing. 25 Only Texas refused to revise its permit program or accept the FIP.
26
On August 2, TCEQ Chairman Bryan Shaw and Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott wrote a defiant six-page letter to EPA stating, "Texas has neither the authority, nor the intention of interpreting, ignoring, or amending its laws in order to compel the permitting of greenhouse gas emissions." 27 Carbon dioxide was, in their opinion, "a uniformly distributed, trace constituent of clean air, vital to all life, that [was] emitted by all productive activities on Earth." 28 Shaw later explained that he saw no "value in pursuing what is sort of a farce that is going to have only cost and no environmental benefits." 29 In his response to the August 2 letter, Armendariz maintained that EPA's GHG regulations were "measured steps" in response to the Supreme Court's opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA. 30 He dismissed the letter's "unsubstantiated claims" as the sort of arguments that "have been made-and ultimately proven wrong-every time EPA has, over the past forty years, moved to implement the Clean Air Act's protections of public health and welfare."
31 Behind the scenes, Armendariz reached out to companies with large industrial facilities in Texas to urge them to convince the TCEQ Commissioners to cooperate with EPA.
32
C. EPA Takes Over Texas's Permitting Authority
On December 23, 2010, Administrator Jackson signed an interim final rule "correcting" its 1992 approval of the Texas State Implementation Plan ("SIP"), changing the approval to a partial approval and partial disapproval, and promulgating a FIP establishing a permitting program for GHG-emitting sources in Texas. 33 The preamble stated that recent statements by Texas made it "particularly evident" that when EPA approved the major revisions to the Texas SIP implementing the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, the SIP still had 25 Id. The Clean Air Act requires states to submit for EPA approval State Implementation Plans ("SIPs") containing regulations and permit requirements that are requisite to attaining the National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") by various statutory deadlines. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2) a significant gap in coverage-it had failed to address pollutants newly subject to regulation as required by the Clean Air Act. 34 The SIP was flawed at the time, and EPA had not addressed those flaws. 35 The Agency was now correcting its previous error by partially disapproving the relevant portions of the SIP. 36 Since more than two years had passed since EPA should have disapproved the Texas SIP, it "exercis[ed] its discretion to immediately promulgate" a FIP under which EPA assumed GHG permitting responsibilities. 37 While TCEQ remained responsible for permitting emissions of the conventional pollutants, the FIP applied EPA's regulatory program to the GHG portion of any permit issued after January 2, 2011.
38 Although TCEQ characterized the takeover as "an arrogant act by an overreaching EPA," 39 the D.C. Circuit rejected Texas's challenge to the action. 40 
D. Dual Permitting of Texas's Coal-Fired Power Plants
While Governor Perry and Chairman Shaw were castigating EPA in the press and challenging its takeover of the GHG permitting process in the courts, companies with GHG emissions that crossed the Tailoring Rule's thresholds were quietly applying for and receiving GHG permits from EPA's Region VI.
41
Region VI issued the first GHG permit, for a 540-megawatt unit at the Lower Colorado River Authority's Thomas C. Ferguson plant near Marble Falls, Texas, 42 only eight months after it received the application, thereby defying industry predictions that EPA would unduly delay the permitting process.
43 Not all proceedings, however, went so smoothly. For example, Chase Power Development's massive Las Brisas Energy Center project, which was designed to burn an unwanted byproduct of petroleum refineries called petroleum coke or "petcoke," received a Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD") permit from TCEQ, but the company cancelled the project after it failed to persuade 34 
E. Armendariz Resigns
On April 25, 2012, Senator James Inhofe (R-Oklahoma) released a video of a speech in which Regional Administrator Armendariz described his philosophy of enforcement. 45 He related how the Romans conquered small villages by crucifying "the first five guys they saw." 46 The point was to "[f]ind people who are not compliant with the law, and you hit them as hard as you can and you make examples out of them, and there is a great deterrent effect there." 47 Fox News and conservative commentators seized on the video to criticize the Obama Administration's "radical eco-bureaucrats."
48 Although Armendariz quickly apologized for his "offensive and inaccurate" remarks, 49 his apologies did not satisfy Senator Inhofe and the other critics who maintained that Armendariz was accurately relating EPA's enforcement policy. 50 Five days after Inhofe publicized the video, Armendariz resigned. 51 In a demonstration that the revolving door opens to public interest groups as well as industry, the Sierra Club hired Armendariz two months later to work on its "Beyond Coal" campaign.
52
F. EPA Backs Off as It Attempts to Resume Control
In September 2012, Administrator Jackson appointed Ron Curry, a former head of the New Mexico Environment Department, to replace Armendariz as Regional Administrator. 53 55 Over the next year and a half, it finalized forty-one GHG permits for projects in Texas and proposed another ten for approval. 56 Some of these permits were approved over the vigorous opposition of environmental groups. 57 In June 2013, Governor Perry signed legislation empowering TCEQ to issue permits to major sources and major modifications of existing major sources of GHG emissions. 58 The regulations that TCEQ proposed in order to implement the statute appeared for the most part to comply with EPA's requirements for state GHG permitting programs, but there were some controversial provisions as well. 59 As required by the Texas statute, the regulations provided that GHG permit applications would not be subject to adjudicatory "contested case" hearings, even though other permit applications were subject to such hearings. 60 Instead, a challenger would be able to submit written comments and secure judicial review of a challenged permit in state district court. 61 The regulations further provided that the permitting officials would not consider the incremental impacts of the source's GHG emissions on global warming. 62 Finally, they stated that Best Available Control Technology ("BACT") for GHGs would generally rely on fuel limitations and process controls aimed at increasing efficiency, but TCEQ would not consider "add on" controls like carbon capture and sequestration. 63 [Vol. 39 cently permitted sources in the same industry. 66 If the proposal employed a novel technology, it had to undergo additional "tier 2" and sometimes "tier 3" analysis. 67 Although EPA had previously approved TCEQ's three-tier approach for addressing conventional pollutants, several environmental groups had petitioned EPA in 2008 to prevent TCEQ from using that approach because it consistently allowed sources to employ less stringent technologies than EPA's approach. 68 The petition argued that by focusing exclusively on technologies already in place, the TCEQ approach did not envision technological improvement over the years and therefore did not operate on a "case-by-case basis" as required by the Clean Air Act.
69
To speed up the process of approving the changes to the Texas SIP that were necessary to allow TCEQ to assume responsibility for GHG permitting, EPA took the unusual step of engaging in "parallel processing," an approach to SIP approval that allowed the EPA staff to begin its analysis of the SIP revision while TCEQ was still allowing public comment on its proposal and reacting to those comments. 70 The problem with parallel processing was the implicit assumption that the state would not change the proposal in any significant fashion in light of the public comments.
The assumption proved accurate, as the final regulations that TCEQ sent to EPA for approval did not vary significantly from the proposal. 71 By the time TCEQ published them, EPA had already published a notice in the Federal Register proposing to approve most aspects of the regulations and proposing to rescind most aspects of the GHG FIP. 72 The preamble to the proposal provided EPA's analysis of the SIP revisions and stated its conclusion that TCEQ had sufficient authority "to apply the Texas PSD program to all pollutants newly subject to regulation, including non-NAAQS pollutants into the future." 73 Despite the fact that it had not received public comment on the proposal, EPA then sent letters to all of the companies with pending permit applications for GHG permits giving them the option of completing the permit process with EPA or transferring them to TCEQ. 74 On November 10, 2014, EPA formally approved TCEQ's revisions and withdrew the FIP.
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The fact that TCEQ was attempting to regain permitting authority over GHG emissions did not, however, mean that its leadership was any more convinced that GHG emissions posed a serious environmental risk. Indeed, a few days after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued a major report concluding that "[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal" and that the "largest contribution" to the warming is anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide, 76 TCEQ Chairman Shaw told attendees of the Texas Tribune Festival that he was not satisfied that human beings contributed to global warming. 77 
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES UARG
On June 23, 2014, the Supreme Court in UARG upheld the Timing and Tailoring Rules in part and reversed them in part. 78 The Court first held that EPA had impermissibly interpreted the Clean Air Act to conclude that a source would have to undergo PSD New Source Review ("NSR") and obtain a Title V permit solely on the basis of its potential to emit GHGs. 79 Although the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA had held that GHGs were "air pollutants" under the statute's broad definition of that term, the pollutants that triggered the PSD and Title V permit requirements were in a smaller category of regulated air pollutants. 80 The Agency's Tailoring Rule did not make its interpretation of "air pollutant" in the NSR and Title V contexts any less unreasonable, because an agency had "no power to 'tailor' legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms." 81 The Court noted that it would be "hard to imagine a statutory term less ambiguous than the precise numerical thresholds at which the Act requires PSD and Title V permitting." 82 Turning its attention to sources that crossed the statutory thresholds for conventional pollutants (the so-called "anyway" sources), the Court held that EPA had reasonably interpreted the Act to require permit applicants to include GHGs in determining BACT requirements for those sources. 83 The Court rejected the industry argument that BACT was "fundamentally unsuited" to GHG regulation because the only way to reduce GHG emissions from a source was [Vol. 39 to regulate energy production and use. 84 Among other things, carbon capture and sequestration was a control technology that should be considered for large GHG emitters. 85 But certain limitations on BACT ensured that the permit applicant's discretion in imposing energy efficiency requirements was not unbounded. 86 
III. THE IMPACT OF UARG ON GHG REGULATION IN TEXAS
The Supreme Court's opinion in UARG will probably have very little impact on either the permitting of major sources in Texas or on the tension that still exists between EPA and TCEQ. First, UARG's limitation of the PSD and Title V permitting requirements to BACT determinations for "anyway" sources will have little impact on the number of sources subject to BACT analysis for GHG emissions or on the GHG-emissions reductions that will result. "Anyway" sources account for about eighty-three percent of stationary source GHG emissions in the United States while only about three percent come from sources with GHG emissions that cross the Tailoring Rule's thresholds but with emissions of conventional pollutants that do not cross the statutory 100 and 250 tons per year thresholds. 87 The vast majority of new major sources and existing sources that undergo major modifications in Texas will therefore have to comply with the BACT requirement for GHGs. Thus, as a practical matter, the State of Texas lost its appeal.
Perhaps the most important question going forward concerns the implications of the UARG opinion on the seriousness with which TCEQ will go about the task of implementing the Tailoring Rule. At the insistence of the affected industries, the Texas Legislature enacted legislation authorizing TCEQ to issue permits to sources of GHG emissions, but only "[t]o the extent that greenhouse gas emissions require authorization under federal law." 88 The Texas Legislature also required TCEQ to repeal the program if "authorization to emit greenhouse gas emissions is no longer required under federal law." 89 An EPA guidance memo issued a month after the Supreme Court's decision declared that it would no longer require states to include in their SIPs a requirement that non-"anyway" sources obtain PSD permits. 90 TCEQ will therefore have to amend its regulations to restrict the program to anyway sources. To avoid wasting time approving TCEQ's now defunct GHG program, EPA would be welladvised to wait until TCEQ has complied with the Texas statute.
As noted above, TCEQ's leadership still believes that GHG regulation is wholly unnecessary. Environmental groups have objected to TCEQ's assuming GHG permitting authority because they do not trust TCEQ to make Texas sources toe the line. This concern is magnified by the fact that the Legislature exempted GHG permitting from the formal "contested case" procedures that ordinarily apply to TCEQ permits for individual sources. They also worry that TCEQ's unique three-tiered approach to determining BACT will not require Texas GHG permittees to do enough to reduce GHG emissions. While it remains to be seen whether TCEQ will take its new responsibilities seriously once EPA finally approves its GHG program, that approval is not likely to reduce EPA's workload because it will probably have to respond to many petitions by environmental groups to overturn TCEQ's permitting decisions.
Another question of immediate interest is whether TCEQ's loss in UARG will dissuade it from playing a similarly obstructionist role in implementing EPA's forthcoming "carbon pollution" regulations governing existing power plants. On June 2, 2014, EPA Administrator McCarthy signed proposed "statespecific rate-based goals for carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector" and "guidelines for states to follow in developing plans to achieve the statespecific goals." 91 Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act requires states to submit plans containing performance standards for GHG emissions reflecting the "best system of emission reduction which . . . the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated" ("BSER"). 92 Instead of suggesting emission-reduction technologies, however, the Agency proposed "state-specific" GHG emission-reduction goals, which reflected EPA's calculation of the overall "emission limitation that each state can achieve through the application of the BSER" to the relevant sources within the state. 93 Despite the proposal's great flexibility in meeting its overall goal, the reaction of Texas elected officials suggests that the state will continue its obstructionist ways. The proposal gives the states a great deal of flexibility in meeting the prescribed goals, but also expects the states to cooperate in the spirit of reducing GHG emissions by thirty percent over a ten-year period. 94 Governor Perry called the proposal "the most direct assault yet" on the Texas energy industry. 95 Attorney General Greg Abbott, who was at that point a candidate for governor, complained that the Obama Administration was "doubling down on their job-killing agenda with this latest proposal." 96 And TCEQ continued to
